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PUBLIC PROCEDURES FOR THE PROMULGATION 
OF INTERPRETATIVE RULES 
AND GENERAL STATEMENTS OF POLICY 
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal, state, and local administrative agencies produce increasing 
numbers of policies that spread into every recess of modern life. So 
much so that what Justice Jackson called the "fourth branch"~ creates 
much of the "law" that controls many of the intimate details of our 
lives.2 This law finds expression more often through administrative 
rulemaking than through agency adjudication.3 This increasing empha-
sis on rulemaking has intensified the study of rules. Of the various types 
*Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. B.A. 1966, University of 
Maryland; J.D. 1969, George Washington University; LL.M. 1975, University of Chicago. 
1. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 ( 1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
2. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F .2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 
(courts increasingly asked to review agency action affecting fundamental personal in-
terests in life, health, liberty). 
3. Recently courts and commentators have expressed some doubt as to the validity or 
utility of the distinction between rules and orders, or between rulemaking and ad-
judication. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500-Ql (4th Cir. 1973) 
(court sho11ld look to issue of proceedings rather than classification to determine pro-
cedures necessary); Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dictum), cert, 
denied, 405 U.S.1074 (1972) (in many cases there is a fine line between adjudicatory and 
rulemaking proceedings); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.01, at 286 
(1958) (particular activity, not label, should determine procedural needs). The Supreme 
Court's opinion in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, however, demonstrates 
the continued validity of the distinction. 410 U.S. 224 (1973). The Court noted, in dis-
tinguishing between the promulgation of rules and the adjudication of disputed facts, that 
the two salient characteristics of rules are their general applicability and legislative 
nature. Id. at 224-46; see Roffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 478 F.2d 1, 13 (3d Cir. 
1973) (agency finding had characteristics of rules; proceeding was rulemaking). Courts 
have utilized general application as a characteristic of a rule even though the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) defines rules as covering actions of "particular applicability." 
Administrative Procedure Act§ 2 (c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970). A rule mav have general 
effect, but apply directly only to one or a few specific individual interests. See, e.g., 
Associated Electric Coop., Inc. v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1167, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975) (FPC rulemaking power includes setting rates for one 
customer); PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 732 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) (SEC has discretion to utilize rules or orders in dealing with 
specific individuals or situations); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1303, 
1306 (lOth Cir. 1973) (proposed EPA regulation, although a general rule, only affected one 
company). Agency action has the second characteristic, legislative nature, if it con-
templates policymaking for the future. However, retroactive rules may be valid if their 
retro~pective applicability is reasonable. See, e.Jl., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,203 
(1947) (retroactive effect must be balanced against harm produced contrary to statutory 
design); Maceren v. District Dir., Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 509 F.2d 934, 939-
41 (9th Cir. 1974) (retroactive application of rule invalidated due to undue hardship and 
lack of sufficient statutory interest); General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 863-
64 (5th Cir. 1971) (rule with retroactive effects not unreasonable or invalid). Thu!f, 
generalized application and prospective policy formulation serve as the best indications 
that agency action is a rule. 
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of substantive rules,4 legislative rules have been the most closely 
studied. By experimentation and analysis, we are beginning to 
understand legislative rulemaking, but our understanding of the 
substantive rules that do not fit easily into that category, such as 
interpretative rules and general statements of policy, remains primi· 
tive.5 Because even a brief survey of agency policy announcements 
suggests that nonlegislative rules predominate, the need to explore some 
of the characteristics and problems unique to these "lesser rules" is 
obvious. 
Distinctions among legislative rules, interpretative rules, and general 
statements of policy have long been recognized.6 Legislative rules are 
those policy pronouncements that are made pursuant. to legislative 
authority,' that normally must be made through the procedures 
prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),8 and that are 
subject to limited judicial review.9 An agency with such authority 
4. The term "substantive rules" is used in this article to distinguish these rules from 
procedural rules. The term is often used to refer to legislative rules. See UNITED STATES 
DEP"TOF JUSTICE, A '!TORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AfYr 
30 n.3 (1947) (hereinafter cited as ATT'Y GEN.'S MANUAL); Note, Administrative 
Law-FTC Denied Substantive Rulemaking Power, 21 KAN. L. REV. 198, 199·200 (1973). 
Nonlegislative rules, however, may also be substantive; thus, the term "legislative rules" 
in this article means rules promulgated under legislative authority and in compliance with 
the notice and comment requirements of the AP A. See Administrative Procedure Act §§ 
4{a) (1)-{3), (b), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 (b) (1)-(3), {c) (1970); notes 7-9 infra and accompanying 
text. 
5. Rules may appear under various labels: guides, rulings, guidelines, interpretations, 
office memoranda, opinions, adjudicatory opinions, general counsel memoranda, and 
others. The APA uses the terms "interpretative rules" and "general statements of policy" 
in reference to substantive rules that need not be made after notice and comment 
procedures. Administrative Procedure Act§ 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A) (1970). 
6. See Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See generally Lee, 
Legislative and Interpretative Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1·4 (1940 ). 
7. SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 5.03, at 299. While the term "legislative rules" is not 
always used, the concept oflegislative rules, rules made pursuant to delegated power, has 
become firmly established. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235·36 (1974) (legisla· 
tive rules promulgated under legislative power through requisite proced.ures); Mourning 
v. Family Publication Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (Federal Reserve Board has 
rulemaking power to promote purposes of enabling legislation); National Nutritional 
Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 142, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (legislative 
rulemaking power necessary to interpret statutes). Compliance with legislative rules can 
be enforced with legal sanctions. See Lee, supra note 6, at 3. 
8. Administrative Procedure Act§§ 4(a)·{d), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)·{e) (1970) (notice and 
comment procedures). If the "rules are required by statute to be made on the record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing," then sections 556 and 557 prescribe the appropriate 
trial-type procedures. See id. §§ 7, 8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557; cf. United States v. Florida East 
Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 238-46 (1973) (most legislative rulemaking requires section 553 
procedures; adjudication of disputed facts requires procedures of sections 556 and 557). 
9. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 485, 488 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (Secretary's decision nonarbitrary; judicial review presents the risk of arbitrary 
supervision and revision of efforts to implement that statute's purposes); Charnita, Inc. v. 
FTC, 479 F.2d 684, 687 (3d Cir. 1973) (regulation consistent with legislative purpose will 
not be overturned); Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F .2d 601, 619 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 
377 U.S. 922 (1964) (review of rules of general application present11 only legal 
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initially designates a rule to be legislative by promulgating it pursuant 
to delegated authority or by acting so that it can be inferred that the 
rule is so promulgated.10 Interpretative rules are conceptually distinct 
from legislative rules.U Contrary to some opinions,12 interpretative 
rules do not necessarily interpret either a statute or another rule,13 
question-whether factual premise is arbitrary or capricious). This limitation on judicial 
review should not be carried too far because agencies are not directly subject to control by 
the electorate. See Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 738-45 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U.S. 1074 (1972) (factual basis of rule subject to review, but court may not substitute its 
judgment for the agency's); REPORT OF TilE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. 
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 101·02 (1941) (administrative agency not a repre-
sentative body; members not subject to direct political control like legislators) 
[hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 8]. Legislative rules should be considered as "quasi-
legislative," not as legislation per se. See Chicago v. FPC, supra at 742 (rulemaking is not 
totally equivalent to legislative action). But cf. Pacific State Box & Basket Co. v. White, 
296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) (rebuttable presumption that facts exist to justify exercise of 
police power attaches to state regulation with legally delegated authority just as well as to 
statute). 
10. See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Ad-
ministrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 930 ( 1965 ). 
11. A distinguished judge, knowledgeable in the field of administrative law, has written 
that "[t]his Court accepts with alacrity the authoritative view that it is not profitable to 
explore the asserted distinction [between legislative rules and interpretative rules] which 
is 'fuzzy at best.' "National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 142, 146 
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Frankel, J.); see Shapiro, supra note 10, at 930. One can quarrel with 
Judge Frankel's statement on several points. The distinction is not "fuzzy" but clear: a 
legislative rule must be promulgated pursuant to a legislative grant of authority. The dis-
tinction is troublesome not because it is unclear, but because it is not always easy to deter-
mine whether there was congressional intent to confer legislative rulemaking authority 
and if that authority is clear, whether the agency intended to promulgate the rule pursuant 
to that authority. Secondly, the distinction is indeed "profitable" since both the scope of 
review and the required procedure depend on the distinction. Lastly, Judge Frankel might 
have difficulty demonstrating that he has recited the "authoritative view." See notes 6-7 
supra. 
Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc. illustrates the distinction between legislative and 
interpretative rules. 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit relied on four sources in 
applying the Truth in Lending Act: the Act, Regulation Z, the agency's interpretative 
rules under Regulation Z, and staff opinion letters. Id. at 976. Unfortunately, the court 
lumped all the agency pronouncements, including Regulation Z, together and found t:.tat 
they were not binding on the court, but were only entitled to "great weight.'' I d. Clearly, 
Regulation Z is a legislative rule, which can be distinguished from either the interpretative 
rules or the opinion letters, and is binding unless arbitrary or capricious. See note 9 supra. 
Contrary to the opinion, the court was free to substitute its judgment for the 
interpretative rules and the staff opinion letters but not for Regulation Z. See notes 15-16 
infra and accompanying text. 
12. See, e.g., American Bancorporation, Inc. v. Federal Reserve System, 509 F.2d 29,34 
(8th Cir. 1974) (amended regulation expressing agency's view of original regulation an 
interpretative rule); Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (interpretative rules are the agency's construction of a statutory provision); Reeves 
v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455,458 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975) 
(same); ATT'Y GEN.'S MANUAL, supra note 4, at 30 n.3 (interpretative rules are "rules or 
statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the 
statutes and rules that it administers"). 
13. SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 5.03, at 304 (interpretative rules may also interpret 
another interpretative rule, judicial decisions, administrative decisions, administrative 
rulings, any other law or interpretation, any combination of these, or nothing at all). 
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether an announcement changing a legislative 
rule is an amendment of the rule or merely an interpretative rule based on the legislative 
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except to the extent they may be said to interpret the nebula of law 
and policy handed down by Congress through the agency's enabling act. 
The authority to develop interpretative rules rarely emanates from a 
specific legislative grant; the power is most often derived from the 
establishment of an administrative agency and the nature of its 
expertise.14 Because interpretative rulemaking is usually an assumed 
power, it is appropriate that interpretative rules do not bind, but may 
persuade, a court in its exercise of judicial review.15 Thus, interpretative 
rule. See Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244, 246-49 (6th Cir. 1974) (substance of 
charge was rulemaking and subject to section 553 procedures); United States v. Finley 
Coal Co., 493 F.2d 285, 289-91 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1089 (1974) (substantive 
revision of mandatory standards requires rulemaking procedures). 
14. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir. 
1975) (specific.delegation of power to promulgate rules not always necessary; general 
delegation sufficient in certain areas of expertise). Because Congress cannot foresee every 
problem that will confront an agency, necessary and proper power must be recognized, and 
the cases are legion that uphold the exercise of powers not specifically delegated to the 
agency but necessary to implementation of the legislative mandate. See, e.g., United 
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168·78 (1968) (Court looked to enabling 
act's terms, purposes, and legislative history to find broad authority for FCC to issue rules 
and regulations); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968) (scope of 
agency's authority determined by purposes for delegation of authority); American 
Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967) (agencies have power 
to promulgate new regulations to meet changing needs and patterns of regulated conduct). 
The exercise of the power to make interpretative rules is on even firmer ground; not only is 
such power necessary, but it is a characteristic power of administrative agencies. The mere 
creation of an administrative agency can be said to carry with it certain inllerent powers, 
one of which is the power to make interpretative rules. See Davis, Administrative 
Rules-Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 930 (1948). The 
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act is one instance where Congress separately 
granted the two rulemaking powers. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act § 
202(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(a)(1) (Supp. 1976). In the Privacy Act of 1974 Congress 
intentionally denied the Privacy Protection Commission legislative rulemaking and 
expressly charged the Commission with defining policy through interpretative rules. Pub. 
L. No. 93·579, § 5(e), 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. IV, 1974); seeS. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 39 (1974). 
15. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.134, 140 ( 1944) (courts should weigh evidence, 
including interpretative rules, and decide each case on its facts); National Nutritional 
Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir. 1975) (FDA's interpretative rules 
are advisory and subject to challenge and review). 
After over thirty years, no court has been able to improve on Justice Jackson's 
authoritative statement in Skidmore that while interpretative rules are not controlling 
upon courts, they "do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which 
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 323 U.S. at 140. The weight given 
to the agency's judgment will depend upon the thoroughness of consideration, the validity 
of reasoning, consistency with prior and subsequent pronouncements, and other factors 
which make the agency's opinion persuasive, even if not controlling. I d. Extra weight may 
be given to an interpretative rule because of such factors as agency specialization, 
statutory reenactment, contemporaneous construction of a statute by the agency charged 
with its enforcement, and longstanding effectiveness. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 
416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (great weight given longstanding interpretation where Congress 
reenacted statute without relevant change); NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74·75 
(1973) (great weight afforded longstanding, contemporaneously construed agency inter· 
pretation); Davis, supra note 14, at 934-43 (contemporaneous construction, longstanding 
interpretation, reenactment are factors in courts' determinations of authority to give 
interpretative rules).But cf. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 864·65 (D.C. Cir.) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973) (interpretations contrary to legislative intent 
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rules may be subject to de novo review, and courts are usually free to 
substitute their judgment for that of the agency.16 General statements 
of policy are not easily distinguished from interpretative rules, but the 
terms themselves may provide a distinction: rules are fairly concrete 
standards of conduct; statements are mere expressions of policy.17 A 
general statement of policy may be a vehicle for disclosure of less 
formal, tentative policy that exists in the agency and that has reached a 
threshold level of concreteness sufficient to make disclosure of some 
value. Although attempts have been made to distinguish the two/ 8 
may be overturned no matter how longstanding). These factors will affect the court's 
decision and push the court in the direction of giving more weight to an interpretative rule 
except where the court feels confident in its own expertise over the subject matter. 
By far the most consistent judicial approach is to give deference to the pronouncement 
embodied in an interpretative rule. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94·95 
( 1973) (interpretative rule entitled to great deference unless inconsistent with congression· 
a1 intent); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971) (where enabling act and 
legislative history support interpretative rule, guidelines treated as expressing the will of 
Congress). Although a court may give a rule great weight, it is not properly "bound" by an 
interpretative rule. Nevertheless, courts sometimes use language indicating that they felt 
bound by an interpretative rule. See, e.g., Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co., 469 F.2d 453, 
456 n.2 (9th Cir. 1972) (court bound where agency's interpretation not outside its 
authority); CIBA-GEIGY Corp. v. Richardson, 446 F.2d466, 467-68 (2d Cir.1971) (agency 
has power to issue binding interpretative regulations); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, 
Inc., 329 F. Supp. 936, 939 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (agency's interpretations consistent with act 
and not plainly erroneous entitled to great weight or binding). An egregious example is 
found in Morris u. Richardson, where the court accepted HEW's interpretation that the 
phrase "public child-placement agency" in a statute governing benefits for adopted 
children did not include a county court, even though there was no adoption agency in the 
county, and state law required that adoptions be decreed in the county where the adoptive 
parents reside. 455 F .2d 775, 777-78 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 
422 (1973). 
16. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Aar, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.18 (1945) [hereinafter S. Doc. 
No. 248] (interpretative rules are subject to plenary judicial review). 
17. Administrative Procedure Act §4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Although section 553 
expressly exempts "gener!ll statements of policy" from the notice provision, and thereby 
the comment provision, and "statements of policy" from the timing requirements, it is un· 
likely that the drafters intended to establish a distinction between the two terms. See id. 
§§ 4(a), (c), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(A), {d) (2). A distinction would exempt general statements 
of policy from the notice and comment provision but not individualized or specific state-
ments of policy. Notice and comment is even less suitable for specific statements of policy 
than it would be for general statements of policy. The drafters of the AP A could not have 
intended this result, and hence, it seems proper to consider the terms in sections 553(b )(A) 
and 553(d)(2) as covering the same subject matter. On the other hand, section 552(a)(1) 
(D) requires publication of "statements of general policy," while section 552(a)(2)(B) 
requires that "statements of policy" be made available for public inspection and copying. 
See id. §§ 3(a) (3), (c), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (a) (1) (D), (2) (B). In this provision a distinction 
makes sense. Expressions of general policy should be made generally available through 
publication, whereas expressions of policy of special interest need only be available to 
those with interest enough to make an effort to elicit the information. The rationale of 
having only material of general interest in the Federal Register is supported by the view, 
urged for many years, that the Federal Register contains too much and not too little. 
18. See Pacific Lighting Serv. Co. v. FPC, 518 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1975) (statement 
of Commission policy not a "rule"); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38-39 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (general policy statement announces agency policy for the future, but does 
not bind courts or finally determine rights or issues). 
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there appears to be no analytical purpose served by such a distinction 
because the concepts that relate to these and other nonlegislative rules 
are the same. The rules are exempt from the notice and comment 
procedures of the .AP A, codified in section 553 of title 5 of the United 
States Code. 19 They each have the same persuasive effect on judicial 
review,20 and they bind the agency where necessary to ensure fairness 
It has been suggested that general statements of policy are rules directed primarily at 
the staff of an agency and intended to guide the staff in conducting discretionary 
functions, while other rules are directed primarily at the public in an effort to impose 
obligations on them. See Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the 
Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy under the A.P.A., 23 AD. 
L. REv.l01, 115 ( 1971). The Attorney General's Manual distinguishes the two differently: 
General Statements of Policy-statements issued by an agency to advise the public 
prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a dis· 
cretionary power, Interpretative Rules-rules or statements issued by an agency to 
advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it 
administers. 
A'IT'Y GEN.'S MANUAL, supra note 4, at 30 n.3. I tis questionable whether either distinction 
is very meaningful. Every expression of policy, whether made through adjudication, 
legislative rulemaking, or otherwise, deals with and limits agency discretion. It is naive to 
think that an interpretation of a statute or rule can divorce itself from the discretion of the 
agency. A general statement of policy may disclose the agency's policy in exercising its 
discretion, but so do interpretative rules, legislative rules, and precedent gleaned from ad· 
judicative orders. A distinction based on the difference between interpretation and the dis· 
closure of how such discretion will be exercised is neither meaningful nor helpful. 
19. See Administrative Procedure Act§ 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A) (1970). Subsection 
553(e), conferring the right to petition, does not contain any exceptions; thus, all rules, 
except those listed in subsections 553 (a) (1) and (2), are subject to petition for issuance, 
repeal, or amendment by an interested person. Id. §§ 4(1)·(2), (d), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a) (1)· 
(2),(e). 
20. Some courts have attempted to distinguish the effects of the two suggesting that 
interpretative rules are entitled to "great weight" while general statements of policy are 
only entitled to "weight." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33,40 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(general statement of policy entitled to less deference than a rule or adjudicative order); cf. 
Helton v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 365, 368 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971) (guides and 
handbooks have some weight, but not that of interpretative rules); Futrell v. Columbia 
Club, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 566, 571 (S.D. Ind. 1971) (interpretative rules entitled to "con· 
siderable weight;" opinion letters entitled to "weight"). This distinction is of little value; 
the court should ignore labels and look instead to the factors bearing on the persuasive· 
ness of the particular rule or policy. See note 15 supra. 
Because the APA allows judicial review of final agency action only, the District of 
Columbia Circuit, in Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass 'n v. SEC, was compelled to 
deal with the scope of review of certain general statements of policy. 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971); 'see Administrative Procedure Act§§ 10(a), (c), 5 
U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1970). The court held that where general statements of policy are 
intended to and do result in action on the part of regulated businesses, the statements will 
be subject to judicial review. 442 F.2d at 142; see notes 47·53 infra and accompanying 
text; cf. Pacific Gas &Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38·39 (9th Cir. 1975) (judicial review, 
under the Natural Gas Act, of general statements of policy limited to instances in which 
the statements have an immediate and significant impact and there is a record suitable for 
review). The court will limit the scope of its review to the questions whether the general 
statement of policy was ultra vires and whether some factual basis for the agency action 
existed. Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass'n v. SEC, supra at 142, 145. The factual 
basis is "presumed to exist unless negatived by the challenger." I d. at 145. 
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to an adversely affected party.21 
Broad procedural discretion is a major advantage for agencies that 
make policy through interpretative rules and general statements of 
policy, but the complete absence of procedures for the promulgation of 
these rules has existed too long. The public deserves a role in the 
making of many such rules, and the lack of any public role has 
undoubtedly resulted in the reluctance of courts to give agencies total 
discretion in choosing the type of rule to issue. 22 The exemption of 
these two types of rules from the procedural requirements of the .AP A 
has been criticized, and legislative proposals to amend the .AP A have 
included the deletion of these exemptions.23 The legislative histocy of 
the APA, however, evidences careful consideration of the exemptions 
and leaves no doubt that the drafters felt that procedural flexibility for 
21. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959) (having chosen a discretionary 
course of action, agency bound by procedural and substantive regulations governing that 
action); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 373-76 ( 1957) (same); United States ex rel. Accardi 
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-68 (1954) (same). Recently, the Supreme Court held 
that a defendant may assert good faith reliance on interpretative rules as a defense in a 
prosecution for violation of a statute. See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. 
Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 673-75 ( 1973). But cf. Note, Judicial Review of Reversals of Policy by 
Administrative Agencies, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1251, 1255-56 (1955) (courts more likely to 
allow retroactive change in interpretative rules than in legislative rules because reliance 
less justified). The best view is that the failure of an agency to follow its own interpretative 
rules should be prima facie evidence of arbitrary or capricious administrative action. See 
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1303 & n.23 (D.D.C. 1973 ), modified 
on other grounds, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (change in interpretative rule may be 
evidence that new interpretation arbitrary or inconsistent). General statements of policy 
should be considered merely a means of disclosure; a court should cautiously bind an 
agency in its attempts to develop and disclose rational policy. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (general statements of policy entitled to less 
deference than rules or adjudicative orders; court should assess underlying wisdom of 
policy). But cf. Note, supra at 1256-57 (because court has as much expertise as agency, 
change in policy based on philosophy should be subject to greater judicial review than 
change due to changed circumstances in the regulated industry). 
22. Hamilton, The Need for Procedural Innovation in Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 
1276, 1314 (1972); see, e.g., Pacific Gas &Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506F.2d 33,40 (D.C. Cir.1974) 
(agency does not have benefit of public exploration when general statement of policy pro· 
mulgated); American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 317 F.2d 887, 890 
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (amendment of order not an interpretative rule, further procedures 
necessary); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858,863-65 (D. Del.1970) 
(regulations that have immediate and substantial impact not interpretative rules; notice 
and comment procedures required). 
23. See, e.g., S. 518, S. 2770, S. 2771, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S.1663, S. 2335, 88th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The Hoover Task Force advocated the repeal of these procedural 
exemptions. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF 
THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 147-50, 157·60 
(1955) (Recommendations 28 and 32) (notice through publication in the Federal Register 
and public participation in the formulation of nonlegislative rules required except when 
public interest demands secrecy). The Model State Administrative Procedure Act incor-
porated these recommendations. Uniform Law Commissioners, Revised Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act, 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT. 147 (Supp. 1967) (reliance on 
the recommendations of the Hoover Report in revising the Model Act). 
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such rules is essential to sound administrative process.24 Agencies faced 
with the necessity of full section 553 compliance might simply choose 
not to promulgate many interpretative rules and general statements of 
policy. 25 The requirements of section 553 would bring benefits, but 
they would also bring disadvantages. 
The solution to this dilemma is the recognition that agencies should 
promulgate many interpretative rules and general statements of policy 
after abbreviated public procedures tailored to particular situations, 
that full section 553 procedures are not always necessary, and that 
procedural requirements cannot be applied equally to all types of rules. 
One possibility for imposing abbreviated procedures on these rules is 
the repeal of the categorical exemptions of interpretative rules and 
general statements of policy from section 553 and the development of a 
flexible approach to the "good cause" exemptions of section 553.26 A 
better approach, however, would be the evolution of a broad range of 
abbreviated public procedures through judicial review of agencies' 
promulgation procedures to ensure that the choice of procedures 
comports with basic notions of fairness and does not abuse the 
agencies' discretion. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE "GoOD CAUSE" ExEMPTIONS IN 
LIEU OF CATEGORICAL ExEMPTIONS 
A means already exists for moderating and rationalizing the 
elimination of the categorical exemptions: two provisions of section 
553 allow agencies to dispense with public procedures when there is 
good cause for doing so. Section 553(b )(B) exempts rules from the 
notice and comment procedures if such procedures would be "impracti-
cable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest,"27 and section 
24. SeeS. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 18 (Senate Judiciary Committee Report) (non· 
legislative rulemaking should be encouraged by giving agencies procedural discretion with 
safeguards of plenary judicial review and petitions for reconsideration). 
Retention of the procedural exemptions for interpretative rules and general statements 
of policy has been supported by the Administrative Conference of the United States. See 
Recommendation 72·5: Procedures for Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, 2 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 66 ( 1972). 
25. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S.1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, and S.1879, 88th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 179 (1965) (statement of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis) (elimination of exceptions 
will lead to concealment of policies). 
26. See AdministrativeProcedureAct§§4(a), (c), 5U.S.C.§§ 553 (b) (B), (d) (3) (1970). 
27. Id. § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (B). Although the exemptions in section 553(b) refer 
only to the notice requirement, it is obvious that they are also incorporated into the public 
participation and statement provisions of section 553(c). Id. §§ 4(a), (b), 5 U.S.C. §§ 
553(b), (c); see S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200, 258 (Report of House and Senate 
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553(d)(3) provides that a rule may become effective immediately upon 
publication where good cause is found.28 Section 553(b)(B) requires 
the agency to incorporate the finding of good cause and the supporting 
reasons in any rule issued without notice and comment, and the agency 
must publish its finding of good cause with the rule intended to be 
effective immediately.29 Although these sections do not contain the 
same language, they most likely will be considered virtually identical. 30 
Thus, the good cause exemption of section 553(d)(3) can be dealt with 
as if it had the "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest" language of section 553(b )(B). 
Although the terms "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest" necessarily overlap, the legislative history of the AP A 
indicates that they were intended to cover different problems.31 Several 
cases have dealt in a very cursory manner with each of these 
justifications for claiming the "good cause" exemption from notice and 
comment procedures. Courts limit the exemption for impracticability 
to situations in which notice and participation would be unreasonable, 
such as where emergency action is required to avoid injury or where full 
notice and comment procedures would frustrate the rule's objectives.32 
Notice and comment procedures may be found unnecessary where the 
rulemaking involves minor matters or refinements in an existing rule, 33 
but not where the rule may have substantial impact.34 Rules for which 
Judiciary Committees) (public participation provisions apply only when notice is 
required). 
28. Administrative Procedure Act§ 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (3) (1970). 
29. Id. §§ 4(a), (c), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 (b) (B), (d) (3); see Kelly v. Department of Interior, 
339 F. Supp. 1095, 1100·02 (E.D. Cal1972) (good cause not shown for exempting section 
553(b) (B) rule from publication). 
30. See Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Making Under the APA, 
71 MICH. L. REV.221, 308..()9 (1972)(sections 553(b) (B) and (d) (3) should be treated alike). 
31. See S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200 (Report of Senate Judiciary Committee). 
32. See Arizona Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456, 481 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(hearing procedures regulations exempted from notice and comment requirements because 
little time before hearings and participants need to know applicable rules of procedure); 
United States v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 342 F. Supp. 272, 277 (D. Md. 1972) 
(unexplained statement that notice and comment procedures impracticable for deter-
mining wage increase ceiling upheld); S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200 (impracticable 
means public procedures would prevent due and required execution of agency functions). 
33. See United States v. United States Trucking Corp., 317 F. Supp. 69, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (procedures unnecessary where regulations reflected internal change in regulatory 
agency); S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200 (unnecessary means minor or technical 
amendments in which the public has no interest). 
34. See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1969) (change in interest 
computation not minor; notice and comment procedures necessary); National Motor 
Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (D.D.C. 1967) (three judge 
court), affd mem., 393 U.S. 18 (1968) (substantial impact of regulation required notice 
and comment procedures). 
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notice and comment are unnecessary are those in which the public bas 
so little interest that an agency would not expect outside participation; 
such rules involve simple mathematical computations and technical or 
grammatical changes in an existing rule. In addition, notice and 
comment procedures may be considered unnecessary where another 
related proceeding afforded the opportunity for participation.35 ·Full 
notice and comment procedures may be contrary to the public interest 
where procedures will defeat the purpose of the rule or seriously impair 
its effectiveness. 36 
Repeal of the exemptions for interpretative rules and general 
statements of policy would not necessarily impose notice and comment 
procedures on all such rules. The nature and usefulness of such rules 
depends to a certain extent on the absence of a public input 
requirement, and hence the good cause justification for eliminating the 
public role in the rule's formulation may be available. The value of the 
good cause exemptions approach lies in the requirement that an agency 
provide written justification for not using section 553 notice and 
comment procedures;37 the categorical exemptions for interpretative 
rules and general statements of policy require no such justification, and 
their exercise hinges only on resolution of the definitional question. 
Controversy over definitions diverts attention from the reasons for not 
using public procedures and focuses instead on the theoretical 
boundaries of the categories. Repeal of the categorical exemptions 
would not necessarily lead to the imposition of an inflexible require-
ment of notice and comment procedures on all interpretative rule-
making and general policy statement formulation, but it would have the 
beneficial effect of requiring written justification where an agency 
desires to forego procedural requirements. 38 
A preliminary study of interpretative rules and general statements of 
policy presented two reasons against replacing the categorical exemp-
tions with the good cause approach: uncertainty whether an action 
35. See Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 8-10 (3d Cir. 1973) (dictum) (hearings 
on state regulations normally sufficient for federal approval, but change in circumstances 
in this case required new hearings); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 502..()3 
(4th Cir. 1973) (hearings on state regulations sufficient). 
36. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(delay in licensing nuclear power plant against public interest); cf. S. Doc. No. 248, supra 
note 16, at 200 (Report of Senate Judiciary Committee) (contrary to the public interest 
exemption supplements the terms impracticable or unnecessary). 
37. See Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1970) (must 
incorporate finding of good cause and brief statement of supporting reasons in rules 
issued). 
38. Unfortunately, courts are not always as firm as they should be in requiring written 
justification. See Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) 
(although no written justification, court found good cause existed for exemption from 
procedural requirements); California v. Simon, 504 F.2d 430, 439 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S.1021 (1975) (same). 
1976] NONLEGISLATIVE RuLES 1057 
qualifies for a good cause exemption may lead an agency to use section 
553 procedures unnecessarily, and the discretion granted the agency 
under the good cause exemptions may increase litigation on procedural 
issues.39 The first objection, that uncertainty will cause agencies to use 
notice and comment procedures unnecessarily, is a danger, but will not 
likely result in a serious problem. Where notice and comment 
procedures are impracticable, the realities of the situation will compel 
the agency to avoid the procedures. Where they are unnecessary, the 
use of procedures will result in little additional delay or expense 
because public participation will be insubstantial. Where notice and 
comment would be contrary to the public ip.terest, conscientious 
agency officials will avoid section 553 procedures. The second 
argument, that use of the good cause exemptions will result in increased 
litigation, is more substantial. Vague rights do lead to increased judicial 
challenge, and the three good cause standards are vague. Nonetheless, 
such procedural challenges will most often come before the courts as 
part of a broader challenge to a rule. Thus, resort to the good cause 
exemptions may increase the number of charges in each challenge but 
not the overall number of challenges. 
If the amount of litigation created by unclear legislative standards for 
rulemaking becomes too great, the agency may, through procedural 
rules, make categorical findings of good cause for exempting specific 
groups of rules and carefully define the instances in which it will apply 
those exemptions.40 The procedural rules might require limited 
participation where good cause will support abbreviation, but not 
39. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 119, 126-28 (1971). 
As part of his work on the Administrative Conference study of the categorical 
exemptions, Bonfield urged that the absolute exemptions of section 553(a) be replaced 
with reliance on the good cause exemptions. See Bonfield, supra note 30, at 309, 355-57 
(use of good cause exemptions in military or foreign affairs rulemaking); Bonfield, Public 
Participation in FederalRulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, 
or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 608-11 (1970). Section 553(a) exempts rulemaking 
relating to military and foreign affairs, agency management and personnel, public 
property, loans, grants, benefits, and contracts from notice and comment requirements. 
Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1970). In defending these 
recommendations against attacks similar to the ones he had leveled against removing the 
categorical exemptions for interpretative rules and general statements of policy, Bonfield 
made two general arguments: First, he noted that the rationales behind the attacks apply 
to rulemaking in general and not to the exempted categories in particular; second, he 
argued that since uncertainty and increased burden apply to only some of the exempted 
rules, not the categories as a whole, the use of the good cause exemptions can solve most 
problems. See Bonfield, supra note 30, at 271-75; Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal 
Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, supra at 
575-82. These defenses apply with equal force to the proposal to remove the exemptions of 
interpretative rules and general statements of policy. 
40. But see Bonfield, supra note 18, at 126-27 (use of good cause exemptions in place of 
categorical interpretative rules and general statements of policy exemptions wonld 
subvert purpose of good cause exemptions as qualified exemptions to be used in case-by-
case analysis rather than as wholesale exemptions). 
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complete elimination, of public procedures. An objection to the 
procedural rule approach is that agencies would place all presently 
exempt rulemaking in the good cause categories.41 Such action by an 
agency, however, would certainly be subject to judicial review for abuse 
of discretion, and such review would be facilitated by the written 
justification that must accompany a good cause determination. Categor-
ical good cause exclusions, a_ccompanied by the reasons for exemption 
from notice and comment, would permit both judicial review and 
public scrutiny of the good cause determination. 
JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF FLEXIBLE PuBLIC PROCEDURES 
FOR INTERPRETATIVE RuLES AND GENERAL 8rATEMENTS 
OF POLICY 
Absent repeal of the categorical exemptions, neither the APA42 nor, 
in most cases, the Constitution43 requires notice and comment 
procedures for nonlegislative rules. Judicial examination of the proce-
dures for promulgating interpretative rules and general statements of 
policy, however, should not end with such a determination. The trend 
in administative law is toward a closer scrutiny of the processes for 
making informal decisions.44 Several cases have suggested that the APA 
notice and comment procedures for legislative rules constitute only a 
minimum standard upon which a court can require further particu-
41. Id. 
42. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82, 87 (5th Cir. 1974) (interpretation of 
existing regulations permissible unless fails to fit within language of the regulations); 
Garelick Mfg. Co. v. Dillion, 313 F.2d 899, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (regulation 
interpreting a prior regulation may be issued without notice or comment); Gibson Wine 
Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (ruling explaining prior regulation is 
interpretative and notice and comment not required). 
43. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944) (hearing not constitutionally 
required for rent control regulation); Willa point Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F .2d 676, 694 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949) (no constitutional right to hearing on 
interpretative regulation). The Second Circuit in Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing 
Authority did suggest that due process might require notice and comment procedures in 
the proper circumstances. 479 F.2d 1165, 1169-70 (2d Cir. 1973). A better approach to rule· 
making would be to avoid an abstract constitutional discussion and concentrate on a 
pragmatic determination of the benefits to be derived from public procedures. Under the 
modem approach to due process, a strong pragmatic argument for public procedures may 
result in a determination that some procedures are required by the due process clause if 
there is a significant impact on a sufficiently important private interest. See Friendly, 
"SomeKindofHearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV.1267, 1278 (1975) (degree of procedural safe-
guards required for due process varies directly with importance of private interest and 
need for and usefulness of particular safeguard in given circumstances and inversely with 
burden and adverse consequences of the safeguard). 
44. See Clagett, Infonnal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent 
Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 53·67; Friendly, supra 
note 43, at 1305-15. 
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larized procedures.45 In the area of interpretative rules and general 
statements of policy, where the APA requires no public procedures, a 
judicial examination of the desirability of additional procedures would 
be appropriate. As a practical matter, many interpretative rules and 
general statements of policy have a substantial effect on the public; and 
although such rules do not have the force of legislative rules, most of 
the affected persons will have no forum, other than the agency, in 
which to challenge the rule. The practical unavailability of substantive 
review makes the need for participation in the policymaking process 
even more critical. 46 
THE REQUIREMENT OFF AIRNESS 
Even though an agency's interpretative rule or general statement of 
policy falls within an exemption from section 553 procedures, judicial 
notions of fairness to those affected by such a rule may require that 
some sort of public procedures be employed. Two opinions by Judge 
Leventhal of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit suggest the development of an expanded, but 
pragmatic, view of procedural requirements for nonlegislative rules, 
based on the concept of fairness. A similar motivation underlies 
opinions applying the "substantial impact" test in their determination 
of whether public procedures are necessary. 
In Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association v. SEC47 appel-
lants, an unincorporated association of securities brokers and dealers 
and several of its members, brought an action alleging that requests by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that the New York 
Stock Exchange "voluntarily" abolish customer-directed "give-ups" 
were, in fact, orders and not mere requests.48 Judge Leventhal, writing 
for the majority, found that because the requests were general 
statements of policy, neither the Securities Exchange Act of 193449 nor 
45. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (procedures required 
will depend on rule in question); Mobil Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251-54 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (APA provides minimum protection); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 
478 F.2d 615, 629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (issue presented will dictate procedures required). 
The need for procedures in addition to notice and comment in legislative rulemaking has 
also been advocated by commentators. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 43, at 1314-15. 
46. But cf. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 122 (less need for public participation in formula-
tion of interpretative rules and general statements of policy than in legislative rules). 
47. 442 F .2d 132 (D.C. Cir.),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971). 
48. Id. at 134. Give-ups are fees directed by large investors, especially institutional 
investors, as payments to brokers not actually concerned with the sale for services 
rendered, such as research. I d. By means of its informal written request process, the SEC 
encouraged the Exchange to voluntarily change its minimum fee schedule for large 
investors and to abolish customer-directed give-ups. I d. at 137. 
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a·hh (1970). 
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the AP A could be read to require notice and participation. 50 Although 
the SEC's request was not subject to the general requirement of notice 
and opportunity for hearing, the court considered whether in certain 
instances "it was incumbent on the Commission to provide such notice 
as a matter of elementary fairness"51 and concluded that fairness may 
require that those materially affected have a reasonable opportunity for 
comment. 52 In the case before it the court found that ample 
opportunity for comment was available because the parties had notice 
that the Commission was considering action in this area and because 
prior proposed rulemaking gave the parties opportunity to submit their 
views to the Commission. 53 
Judge Leventhal further developed the fairness requirement in 
Thompson v. Washington. 54 Although the case did not involve 
rulemaking, the opinion helps define the role of judicial review in 
determining when fairness may require additional procedures not 
prescribed by statute. Thompson involved the rights of public housing 
tenants to challenge HUD approval of a rent increase for a privately 
operated, but federally assisted, housing project.55 As in Independent 
Broker-Dealers, the court was not deterred by the absence of statutory 
procedures and found that fairness alone may require notice and an 
opportunity to submit comments. 56 The court in Thompson did not 
engage in an abstract constitutional analysis, but instead struck a 
careful balance between the practical considerations involved in the 
need for additional procedures. In striking this balance, the court stated 
that fairness requires additional procedures where a person denied 
notice and comment faces the likelihood that an interest will be injured 
by government action.57 Notwithstanding the substantiality of the 
50. 442 F.2d at 144. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. I d. at 144-45. The Seventh Circuit in Steams Electric Paste Co. v. EPA utilized the 
same examination of the need for additional procedures for the formulation of an inter· 
pretative rule. 461 F.2d 293, 304 (7th Cir. 1972). While the APA did not require the agency 
to solicit comments, the court found the agency's solicitation proper and appropriate in 
order to give industry-wide notice of its proposed position. I d. Thus, the court found that 
the agency had done all that was necessary in the interest offairness. !d. 
54. 497 F .2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
55. I d. at 628. Thompson is also significant in that it provides a right to some kind of 
hearing where there was no direct government action. Jd. at 637. The law seemed to be to 
the contrary. See Langevin v. Chenago Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(insufficient FHA involvement in approval of rent increase). 
56. 497 F.2d at 638·39; see Independent Broker· Dealers' Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 
132, 144 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 ( 1971). 
57. 497 F.2d at 638. In Marine Space Enclosure, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n the 
court seemed to place the burden of justifying the absence of a hearing in legislative rule· 
making on the agency rather than having the person desiring a hearing prove its necessity. 
420 F.2d 577, 586-87 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Since the additional procedures are not required 
by statute for interpretative rules and general statements of policy, the burden should be 
on the party urging their use. 
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interest or the likelihood of deprivation, the court would not compel an 
opportunity to participate if the "tenants could make no contribution 
relevant to the decisionmaking."58 Though the court's decision in 
Thompson may be interpreted as employing a due process analysis, the 
court's constitutional discussion of the tenants' affected interests only 
served to guide the practical analysis which led to its decision. The 
court explicitly refused to base its decision on constitutional grounds, 
and stated that it was interpreting the National Housing Act of 193759 
to reach a conclusion that would avoid serious doubt as to the Act's 
constitutionality.60 The court relied on "basic fairness, discerned in the 
light of the contemporary regulatory climate."61 Nothing is more 
within the competence of a court than the exploration of procedural 
requirements to guarantee fairness. Similar attention to the realistic, 
practical requirements of fairness must guide courts in prescribing 
additional procedures for the formulation of interpretative rules and 
general statements of policy. 
The decision to require notice and comment procedures involves 
practical considerations; a sound general principle is that fairness 
requires procedures in addition to those explicitly imposed by Congress 
where a court finds that the increased validity of the agency 
decisionmaking process outweighs the procedural burden. This general 
principle should guide the decision concerning what additional proce-
dures are required as well as the decision whether or not to impose 
additional procedures. ,. 
One of the factors in making this determination is the degree of 
impact that an agency decision would have on the interests of the 
public or of private individuals. A number of decisions have focused 
solely on this factor by applying a "substantial impact" test in 
determining whether to require public procedures. Under the substan-
tial impact test, the agency must follow public procedures where rules 
would have a substantial impact on the affected parties. 62 Employing 
analysis similar to the fairness ·approach, two leading cases indicate that 
the test may aid the determination of whether additional procedures 
would be appropriate for substantive rules exempt from section 553 
procedural requirements. Other courts, however, use the test as a 
definitional tool to determine whether a rule is subject to section 553 
58. 497F.2dat638. 
59. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1401-36 (1970). 
60. 497 F .2d at 633, 639. 
61. Id. 
62. See National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90,95-96 
(D.D.C. 1967) (three judge court); Note, The Legislative-Interpretative Distinction: 
SemanticFeintingwithanException toRulemaking Procedures, 54 N.C.L. REV.421, 425 
(1976). 
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procedures. This second approach is incorrect because not all rules can 
be said to be legislative and because nowhere in the language or history 
of the AP A is the degree of impact used to define legislative rules and 
thereby the coverage of section 553. The distinction between the two 
approaches is not merely academic: defining a rule as legislative means 
that the court must limit itself to the arbitrary or capricious standard of 
review and must inflexibly require full section 553 compliance. 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. Finch, 63 which involved 
the FDA's effort to promulgate drug effectiveness regulations, is one of 
the foundation cases in the development of the substantial impact test. 
The challenged regulation required adequate and well-controlled clinical 
investigation by the manufacturer to prove the effectiveness of a 
dreg. 64 The court expressly avoided an attempt to label the regulation 
legislative or interpretative under section 553 despite the agency's 
categorical determination that the rule was procedural and interpre-
tative. 65 In holding that notice and comment procedures were required, 
the court did not use the substantial impact test to categorize the 
regulation under section 553, but instead relied on the basic policy of 
that section. 66 The court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers recognized 
that section 553 is but a statutory reflection of the fairness requirement 
"that when a proposed regulation of general applicability has a 
substantial impact on the regulated industry, or an important class of 
the members or the products of that industry, notice and opportunity 
for comment should first~ be provided."67 Applying this standard, the 
court examined the pervasiveness of the regulation and the complexity 
of the subject matter and determined that notice and comment 
procedures were necessary. 68 
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers opinion relied on two cases to 
support its use of the substantial impact test. In Texaco, Inc. v. FPC69 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 
good cause exemption of section 553 was not applicable to an FPC 
order amending a regulation governing the computation of interest on 
63. 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del.1970). 
64. I d. at 859·60. The regulations provided that the FDA could remove a drug from the 
market for lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness and that a hearing on that removal 
would be granted only where the manufacturer had shown an ability to produce 
substantial evidence of the drug's effectiveness.Id. 
65. I d. at 869. 
66. Seeid. 
67. Id. 
68. I d. at 864·68. The court noted contradictions in the standards of evidence required 
to establish efficacy, the uncertain relationship of drug studies by the National Academy 
of Sciences·National Research Council (NAS-NRCI to the enacted FDA standardil and 
procedures, and the backlog of unreleased NAS-NRC drug study reports. I d. 
69. 412 F .2d 740 (3d Cir.1969). 
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refunds ordered by the agency. 70 The FPC did not contend that the 
form of rule employed was exempt from section 553; rather, the 
agency argued that notice and comment procedures were unnecessary 
and could be dispensed with for good cause. 71 The court correctly 
stated that where there is a substantial impact, notice and comment 
procedures cannot be called unnecessary. 72 Although the court men-
tioned that section 553 procedures will cover rules with a substantial 
impact, its holding relied upon the traditional definitions of legislative 
rules and of the coverage of section 553.73 In National Motor Freight 
Traffic Association v. United States, 74 however, the three judge district 
court used the substantial impact test to determine that a rule was not 
an interpretative rule exempt from section 553.75 Stating that section 
553 notice and comment is necessary whenever an agency takes 
regulatory action of general importance to the regulated industry and 
the public, the court nullified an ICC regulation that established 
procedures for the restoration to shippers of previously declared illegal 
charges because the ICC was taking a significant step in the implemen-
tation of a newly created remedy.76 
Perhaps National Motor Freight, like Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 
can be said to have used the substantial impact test merely to establish 
the need for procedures; if not, the opinion incorrectly applied the test. 
The test is not a valid method for determining whether section 553 
applies, nor is it appropriate for distinguishing legislative rules from 
interpretative rules and general statements of policy. Section 553 
70. I d. at 741-42. 
71. I d. at 743. 
72. I d. The court found the amendment was neither minor nor issued in an emergency 
situation. I d. 
73. Id. at 744-45. The court concluded that "procedures must be followed when an 
agency is exercising its legislative function in order that its rules have the force of law." 
Id. at744. 
74. 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1967) (three judge court), affd mem., 393 U.S. 18 ( 1968). 
75. I d. at 95-97. Several courts have incorrectly relied on the substantial impact test to 
determine whether specific rulemaking is subject to the notice and comment requirements 
of section 553. See, e.g., American Bancorporation, Inc. v. Federal Reserve System, 509 
F.2d 29, 33-35 (8th Cir. 1974) (notice and comment procedures not required where rule 
amendment had no substantial impact); Pickus v. Board of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112-13 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (parole qualification regulations having a substantial impact on parole 
decisions not interpretative rules); Noel v. Green, 376 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 
affd, 508 F .2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 37 (1975) (notice and comment pro· 
cedures not required where no substantial impact on rights of parties challenging rule); 
Akron, C. & Y. R.R. v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (D. Md. 1974) (section 553 
procedures required where rule arguably had substantial impact). The Fourth Circuit 
recently held that compliance with the notice and publication requirements of section 553 
is necessary when the regulations have a "drastic impact." See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F .2d 
215,222 (4th Cir.1975). 
76. 268 F. Supp. at 97. 
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specifically exempts interpretative rules and general statements of 
policy.77 The court in National Motor Freight did not explain the 
relevance of the substantial impact test in defining these categories. 
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon78 demon-
strates that an interpretative rule may have an enormous impact and 
still be validly issued without notice and comment. The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) had followed a policy of qualifying hospitals as 
charitable organizations only if they provided free or low cost service to 
the poor. 79 The IRS, without notice and comment, changed the policy 
in 1969 by issuing a new revenue ruling that allowed hospitals to 
qualify as charitable organizations without providing such free or below 
cost service. 80 The District of Columbia Circuit held, with no mention 
of the substantial impact test, that the ruling was interpretative and not 
subject to the procedural requirements of section 553.81 
Dissenting to the denial of rehearing en bane, Chief Judge 
Bazelon argued that a court should consider whether it would be bound 
by the rule and that since courts give special deference to revenue 
rulings, thus precluding meaningful judicial review, notice and comment 
procedures should be required.82 Chief Judge Bazelon's view of the 
requirements of section 553 is incorrect; the potential deference that a 
court may give an interpretative rule does not overturn the explicit 
77. Administrative Procedure Act§ 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (A) (1970); see A'IT'Y GEN.'S 
MANUAL, supra note 4, at 30 & n.3 (procedures required for rules "issued by an agency 
pursuant to statutory authority"). 
The difference that the reviewing court's choice of either the conventional test or the 
substantial impact test can make on the determination whether section 553 applies is 
important. See, e.g., Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 337 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y.), 
rev'd, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972). In Lewis-Mota the plaintiffs based their procedural 
· challenge to a directive that resulted in the denial of their visas on the substantial impact 
test. I d. at 1294. In rejecting the use of the test, the district court noted that in deter· 
mining the applicability of section 553, the more conventional test is whether the rule in 
question is a legislative rule. I d. at 1294. Applying the conventional test, the court found 
that the rule before it was not legislative and therefore that section 553 procedures were 
not required. Id. at 1294-95. The Second Circuit reversed, relying heavily on the 
substantial impact test to support a requirement of section 553 procedures. 469 F.2d at 
482. 
78. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other Krounds, 44 
U.S.L.W. 4724 (U.S. June 1, 1976). 
79. I d. at 1280 & n.5. 
80. I d. at 1280-81. 
81. I d. at 1290. 
82. I d. at 1292-93 (Bazelon, C.J., with Wright & Robinson, JJ., dissenting to denial of 
rehearing en bane). Judge Wright also dissented to the denial of rehearing en bane and 
argued that because the ruling substantially changed the availability of hospital services 
for the poor, it must comply with the public rulemaking procedures required by section 
553. I d. (Wright, J ., with Bazelon, C.J. & Robinson, J., dissenting to denial of rehearing en 
bane). Judge Wright asserted that millions of poor people would be denied needed medical 
care without the procedural protections provided by law.Id. 
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statutory language. On the other hand, his analysis is consistent with 
the defensible view that, because of the special deference, notions of 
fairness may require some public participation. One factor to consider 
in determining whether fairness requires judicially imposed procedures 
may be the weight given particular exempt rules on review, but this one 
factor does not transform an interpretative rule into a legislative rule. 
A major wealmess of contrived definitions such as the substantial 
impact test or Chief Judge Bazelon's substantial deference analysis is 
that, in manipulating the definitions of interpretative rules and general 
statements of policy for the purpose of imposing public procedures, a 
court subjects the rule to a more limited scope of review. Pickus v. 
Board of Parole83 illustrates the impact that the definitional approach 
may have on the scope of review. Pickus involved rules promulgated by 
the Parole Board for use in determining eligibility for parole. 84 The 
court required section 553 procedures by distinguishing the parole rules 
from general statements of policy, interpretative rules, and procedural 
rules. The rules could not be classified as general statements of policy 
because they were designed to have a substantial effect on parole 
decisions; the rules were not interpretative because they did not 
construe the statute, but operated instead as controls over the exercise 
of the Board's discretion.85 The court held that because the rules had 
the force of law and could be reviewed only for arbit:iariness, they were 
not the kind of rules that Congress meant to exempt from the notice 
and comment requirements of section 553.86 The court's analysis was 
backwards; it failed to make an initial determination whether Congress 
had granted legislative rulemaking authority to the Board. Had it made 
such an inquiry, the court would have found that the Board had no 
authority to make legislative rules in this area;87 thus, the rules were 
either interpretative rules or general statements of policy. Since the 
Board had no legislative rulemaking power, the court was not justified 
in holding that section 553 procedures were required. 
By making the determination that the rules were legislative, the court 
in Pickus ironically limited the scope of its review of the substance of 
83. 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir.1974). 
84. I d. at 1108. 
85. Id. at 1112·13. 
86. See id. at 1112·13. Individual parole decisions are within the absolute, unreviewable 
discretion of the Board. Nothing prevents courts, however, from reviewing the means by 
which parole criteria are promulgated and, in the case of interpretative rules, substituting 
their judgment. Instead, the court in Pickus stated that it could review the substance of 
the parole criteria for "arbitrariness," which would be the appropriate scope of review were 
the criteria legislative rules. I d. 
87. The Board's enabling legislation only authorizes limited rulemaking power. See 18 
U.S.C. § 4208( d) ( 1970) (supervision of paroled prisoners); id. § 5009 (procedures for Youth 
Correction Division of Board). 
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the rules to whether the rules were arbitrary or capricious, the standard 
of review for legislative rules. 88 In defining the rules as legislative, the 
court achieved the beneficial effect of requiring public participation at 
the cost of unnecessarily limiting broad review of the substance of the 
parole criteria. Consistent with its expressed aims, the court could have 
found that the parole criteria were interpretative rules having only. 
persuasive effect and subject to de novo judicial review.89 The court 
then could have found that the substantial impact of the rules and 
fairness to the affected parties required public procedures. Thus, the 
court could have imposed procedures on the rulemaking process 
without violating the AP A and also could have retained the power to 
review the substance of the rules. 
A second weakness with the courts' use of the substantial impact test 
to define which rules must comply with section 553 is that it needlessly 
eliminates flexibility in the type of procedures required. Under this 
approach, once a substantial impact is shown, the agency must fully 
comply with the notice and comment requirements of section 553. 
Under the fairness approach, the court can apply a practical analysis 
not only to the decision to require additional procedures, but also to 
the choice of the type of procedures to require. An almost unlimited 
choice of procedures can be matched to the variety of situations for 
nonlegislative rulemaking.90 A court need not always require full 
compliance with section 553; in some instances only a written 
88. See note 9 supra. 
89. See note 15 supra. 
90. But cf. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235·36 (1974) (dictum) (interpretative rule 
invalid unless published in the Federal Register); Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 
757, 763·64 n.12 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974) (same); Bone v. Hibernia 
Bank, 493 F.2d 135, 139-40 (9th Cir. 1974) (same). Contrary to these cases, however, 
section 552(a) may not require Federal Register publication for interpretative rules. 
Section 552(a) (1) (D) requires publication of "substantive rules of general applicability 
adopted as authorized by law and statements of general policy or interpretations of 
general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency." Administrative Procedure 
Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1970). The phrase "substantive rules of general 
applicability adopted as authorized by law" is a good definition of legislative rules. See 
notes 4, 7 supra. The drafters must have intended to exclude interpretative rules by the 
term "adopted as authorized by law" or that term has no purpose; it would be absurd for a 
statute to specify that illegally adopted legislative rules need not be published. The term 
therefore must distinguish interpretative rules from legislative rules. See ATT'Y GEN.'S 
MANUAL, supra note 4, at 30 n.3 (substantive rules defined as legislative rules). The second 
phrase "statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability" seems to 
refer to a distinct class. The word "rule" is not used; thus the "interpretations" do not 
seem to include interpretative rules for the drafters used the specific term "interpretative 
rules" in section 553. 
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statement justifying an exempt action would be adequate.91 Open 
conferences between the agency and interested parties may be 
sufficient where the action solely or primarily affects easily recog-
nizable groups.92 A rule sometimes could be made effective im-
mediately without notice or comment, but the agency would have to 
accept comments on the final rule and to consider amendments in light 
of those comments. An agency also might promulgate an exempt rule 
without public procedures, but a section 553 proceeding for amend-
ment or reconsideration could be required at some later date.93 The 
numerous types of public procedures make it likely that in a given 
situation some combination should adequately accommodate the 
competing values of efficiency, sound decisionmaking, and fairness. 
Professor Davis wrote in another context that "when we are limited to 
choosing between all and none, we sometimes choose none; if we had a 
choice among all, some, and none, we might sometimes choose some 
instead of none."94 Judges must always remember, however, that in 
some cases, the best alternative may be no public procedures at all. 
Although an agency's rule or statement falls within an exemption to 
the procedural requirements of section 553, fairness may in certain 
cases require public participation. The substantial impact test may 
represent a movement toward the application of the fairness approach. 
Where an exempt, or possibly exempt, rule has a substantial impact on 
91. Public participation causes most of the problems which justify exempting 
interpretative rules and general statements of policy from section 553. The requirement of 
an adequate statement of basis and purpose does not seem to present nearly the same 
problems, and findings and reasons should be required even when other procedures are not 
appropriate. This approach is consistent with the trend towards requiring written 
justification for informal action. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973) (per 
curiam) (reviewing court should obtain affidavits or testimony from agency if failure to 
explain administrative action frustrates effective judicial review); cf. Atchison, T. & S.F. 
Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 805..08, 817 (1973) (to support an order varying 
from past policy, ICC must make its reasons clear to reviewing court). But cf. 
Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 421 U.S.168, 191-92 (1975) (because 
Congress exempted Board from most provisions of AP A, need not disclose reasons for 
decisions). A written justification statement provides an internal check on agency action 
and permits informal criticism. See Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 
F.2d 98, 105..06 (3rd Cir. 1973). See generally Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of 
Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative 
Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV.1276, 1333·36 ( 1972). 
92. See S. Doc. No.8, supra note 9, at 103..05 (consultations and conferences with 
interested private parties may be as adequate as formal hearing). 
93. SeeS. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200 (where agency action beneficial to the 
public does not become effective until issuance of a rule, the rule may be immediately 
issued and supplemental proceedings and reconsideration will satisfy the procedural 
requirements). 
94. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.07, at 169 (1972) (discussing the 
imposition of trial-type procedures for legislative rulemaking). 
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the rights or obligations of those affected, fairness justifies considera-
tion of imposing public procedures, but exempt substantive rules may 
have a substantial impact and still properly be promulgated without 
public procedures or, at least without full section 553 compliance. The 
fairness of the procedural process employed in formulating interpreta-
tive rules and general statements of policy should be considered where 
public participation would contribute to reasoned decisionmaking and 
where the benefits of a public procedure outweigh its potential 
detriments. 
Although the value of the fairness approach is demonstrable, a court 
should apply the concept cautiously and thoughtfully. The exemptions 
to the APA were selected for sound reasons, and a court should 
consider these reasons before imposing procedures. Agencies should be 
able to promulgate rules with some confidence that they have chosen 
procedures that will survive judicial review. Courts should avoid 
burdening the administration of government by creating unnecessary 
confusion as to procedural requirements. Since too much procedure 
may be as harmful as too little, notice and comment procedures should 
not be required where participation would serve no practical purpose.95 
By focusing on the practical need to protect affected persons through 
participation in the rulemaking process, courts need not rely on 
strained definitions and abstract labels. 
THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ADEQUATE 
INFORMATION-GATHERING PROCESS 
In addition to notions of fairness, courts should also examine 
whether additional public procedures for the promulgation of exempt 
rules will significantly increase the information upon which the agency 
bases its decision. A fairness determination weighs the effect of the 
agency's failure to solicit and consider the views of those members of 
the public potentially harmed, but that determination may not be 
enough. Agencies also have a duty to educate themselves fully before 
issuing an interpretative rule or a general statement of policy. Fairness 
requires that all substantially affected parties have some procedure for 
participation, but only the best possible decision on the merits can 
protect the vaguer interests of the public in general. Such a decision can 
best be ensured by employing the most effective information-gathering 
process that is practical under the circumstances. Consequently, the 
multifaceted issues confronted in most policy decisions compel 
';J,~ 95. See Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 640·41 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (effect of rent 
i increase on tenants in public housing warranted use of notice and comment procedures). 
1976] NONLEGISLATIVE RlJLES 1069 
consideration of whether the agency abused its discretion in the choice 
of procedures used to gather relevant information.96 The District of 
Columbia Circuit has declared that an agency must "realistically tailor 
the proceedings to fit the issues before it, the information it needs to 
illuminate the issues and the manner of presentation .... " 97 
The Supreme Court in essence conducted such a· review in NLRB v. 
Bell Aerospace Co. 98 Dealing with the Second Circuit's efforts to 
require notice and comment procedures in National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) policymaking, the Court disagreed with the Board's 
interpretation of a key term, "managerial employees," but would not 
require that the Board undertake legislative rulemaking as the only 
means of defining the term.99 The Second Circuit had held that the 
Board must conduct legislative rulemaking because any new exclusion 
from the term would be a "general rule" which effected a substantial 
change in the law designed to apply to all cases.100 The Supreme Court 
noted that in SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II)1°1 and NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co. 102 it had permitted the formulation of general policy in the 
context of an adjudicative process.103 Though the Court treated the 
conflict as one between "rules" and adjudicative "rules of law," its 
decision effectively sanctioned the formulation of prospective general 
policy, "rules," without notice and comment procedures.104 The 
rationale for permitting the Board the choice between rulemaking and 
adjudicative procedures rested on the Board's discretion to determine 
whether it had sufficient information to make an informed policy 
judgment.105 The Court's review of the exercise of that discretion 
suggests that courts should inquire into the adequacy of the informa-
tion-gathering process regardless of the type of rule. The Court focused 
on whether rulemaking 'vithout notice and comment procedures can 
adequately inform the agency so as to constitute a reasonable exercise 
of administrative policymaking.106 The Court reasoned that although 
section 553 procedures would provide the Board with a forum for 
soliciting the informed views of those affected, the Board reasonably 
96. See generaUy Clagett, supra note 44. 
97. Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 
(1972). 
98. 416 u.s. 267 (1974). 
99. I d. at 294-95. 
100. I d. at 292. 
101. 332 U.S.194 (1947). 
102. 394 u.s. 759 (1969). 
103. 416 U.S. at 292-94. 
104. I d. at 292-95. 
105. Id. at 294-95. 
106. Id. 
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could conclude that "adjudicative procedures may also produce the 
relevant information necessary to mature and fair consideration of the 
issues."107 Because the Board had not abused its discretion in 
determining that adequate information could be and had been acquired 
through adjudication, the Court permitted the agency to formulate 
policy in an adjudicative context. Under this reasoning, courts must 
review for abuse of discretion the information-gathering processes used 
by agencies in formulating nonlegislative rules, including those made in 
the course of agency adjudication, and this review must include a 
determination of the adequacy of the information upon which the 
agency relied. 
Recognition in the legislative history of the AP A that agency 
discretion in the choice of procedure should be limited to processes 
that are "useful to them or helpful to the public" supports judicial 
review of information-gathering procedures for abuse of discretion.108 
Although section 553 procedures were intended to enable an agency to 
educate itself and to assure the public an opportunity to participate, 109 
the exemption of certain types of rules from section 553's coverage 
does not indicate that Congress intended that agencies ignore the values 
of education and public participation gained from the information-
gathering necessary in making such rules. The stringency of the 
information-gathering requirement should vary with the importance of 
the rule and the practicalities of the situation. Rules with substantial 
impact, for example, may give rise to judicial imposition of public 
procedures because the agency developing such rules should obtain all 
realistically available information.U0 The impact of a rule may be one 
factor dictating the relative need for information, but both agencies and 
courts should scrutinize every process employed in making interpre-
tative rules and general statements of policy to ensure that the process 
is capable of producing and did produce sufficient information. The 
ideal of fully informed policymaking, however, should not be adhered 
to blindly; the proper amount of information is a function of the needs 
of the policy decision, and the ideal must be tempered by a great many 
practical considerations. 
A procedure that would result in the largest accumulation of 
accurate information may not be necessary or realistic for many policy 
107. I d. at 295. 
108. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200, 258. 
109. See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969); Pacific Coast European 
Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197,205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965). 
110. See Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (lack of 
procedures precluded notice of defects ana difficulties in order). See generally Comment, A 
Functional Approach to the Applicability of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act to Agency Statements of Policy, 43 U. CHI L. REV. 430, 451-53 ( 1976). 
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pronouncements. An attempt to amass perfectly complete information 
in many instances would interfere with the efficient operation of the 
Government and would cost more than the value of any benefit from 
improved decisionmaking. In determining the adequacy of the informa-
tion-gathering that must support a decision, therefore, the cost of 
obtaining information should be balanced against the significance of the 
rule and the potential utility of additional information. The agency 
must be primarily responsible for striking this balance; the reviewing 
court should accord great weight to an agency's determination.111 
Nonetheless, in reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court may provide 
needed guidance as to the minimum standards of agency education 
necessary for identifiable categories of interpretative rules and general 
statements of policy. 
OBJECTIONS TO THE IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL 
PROCEDURES 
There are three major objections to imposing public participation in 
the promulgation of interpretative rules and general statements of 
policy: the burden of public procedure will encourage "secret policy"; 
the AP A specifically excludes these two rules from procedural 
requirements; and ad hoc imposition of procedures will cause agency 
uncertainty as to the type of procedures that will satisfy reviewing 
courts. Although these are strong arguments, they do not compel the 
conclusion that courts should not, or cannot, impose some procedures 
on interpretative rules and general statements of policy. 
SECRET POLICY 
The recommendation of additional procedures for interpretative 
rules and general statements of policy must overcome the danger that 
the procedural burden will discourage administrative efforts to develop 
and disclose policy.Uz Professor Davis has called notice and comment 
111. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294·95 (1974). 
112. Decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act require that agencies 
disclose any documents that contain "secret law." See Schwartz v. IRS, 511 F.2d 1303, · 
1305 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (no exemption where internal memoranda represent policies, 
statements, or interpretations of adopted agency law); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 
F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (orders and interpretations that actually apply in cases 
before agency must be disclosed); Freedom of Information Act§ 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970); 
Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 797 (1967) .. 
The Act does not require the formulation or consolidation of policy. Much policy exists in 
the minds of the decisionmakers or in numerous internal documents. Rulemaking will 
disclose this policy; the Freedom of Information Act cannot. Although a hard-working 
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rulemaking one of the greatest inventions of modem government,113 
but even this highly efficient procedure may be excessively burdensome 
for much of the rulemaking that agencies undertake. To avoid such a 
burden, an agency may simply choose to avoid promulgating an 
interpretative rule or general statement of policy. Any procedure that 
may encourage secret policy should be suspect; open agency policy has 
been an important trend in recent administrative law theory, and 
interpretative rules and general statements of policy are often the best 
and most efficient means for publicly announcing agency policy. 
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. 
FPC, 114 recently recognized that the desire for open policy may justify 
excepting general statements of policy from procedural require-
ments.U5 The statements of policy in Pacific Gas contained the FPC's 
suggested means for establishing natural gas curtailment priorities in the 
event of a shortage.U 6 Although the statements had the potential to 
revise outstanding natural gas contracts, the court feared that the 
imposition of public procedures would inhibit the disclosure, rather 
than improve the formulation, of curtailment policy. The court noted 
that the Commission could have proceeded on an ad hoc basis and 
tentatively approved specific curtailment plans that were found to be 
just and reasonable instead of formulating a general policy statement.117 
Had the Commission proceeded in an ad hoc manner, the only 
difference from promulgating the policy statement "would be that the 
Commission would be acting under a secret policy rather than under 
the publicized guidelines .... "118 
The performance of routine administrative duties requires that 
agencies make numerous policy pronouncements, which often take the 
form of interpretative rules or general statements of policy. An active 
agency will formulate hundreds of policies in such forms as internal 
member of the public may use the Information Act to obtain material from which to glean 
some idea of an agency's policy, nothing can replace the conscious formulation and 
disclosure of policy by the agency. Discouraging agencies from policy formulation and 
disclosure will have a substantial detrimental impact even with the Information Act. 
113. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 65 (1969), See 
generally Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the 
Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 535·36 (1972) (distinguishes between informal, 
formal, and adjudicative rulemaking proceedings in terms of pressure groups' 
preferences). 
114. 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.1974). 
115. Id. at41. 
116. I d. at 35·36. 
117. I d. at 41. 
118. Id. 
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staff guidelines119 and policy instructions.120 Requiring additional 
procedures for this mass of pronouncements would overburden the 
agency process, increase the expense of government, and greatly 
lengthen the time necessary for the Government to respond to public 
problems.121 The public suffers when administrative agency action is 
unduly inhibited or made overly expensive. Public participation will not 
always improve agency decisionmaking enough to offset the costs of 
imposing the procedure.l22 
The inherent friction between the desirability of public input and the 
need for 'POlicy formulation and disclosure b~comes particularly acute 
in light of the modern trend to require rules and rulemaking. Required 
rulemaking serves two values: disclosure of general agency policy, and 
the opportunity for public participation in the formulation of the 
policy. Efforts to increase public participation in policy formulation 
cannot be permitted to unduly interfere with judicial efforts to nurture 
the consolidation and disclosure of general agency policy. Commenta-
tors, for example, have vehemently criticized the NLRB for its 
reluctance to use rulemaking.l23 Though critics attack the Board for its 
efforts to avoid public procedures by not promulgating legislative rules 
through notice and comment procedures/24 one cannot ignore the 
Board's numerous efforts to formulate and disclose policy through 
other types of rules. Legislative rulemaking through section 553 
procedures is a valuable technique and is preferable in many situations, 
but the role of interpretative rules and general statements of policy in 
the Board's policymaking arsenal is equally clear. The NLRB's 
nonlegislative rule requiring that employers furnish unions with a list of 
employees before an election to select a bargaining r-epresentative, 
119. See Nader v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.) (FAA 
approval of X-ray inspection methods not mere internal memoranda where authorization 
of use given). 
120. See Noel v. Green, 376 F. Supp.1095, 1099 (S.D.N.Y.1974),a{fd, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d 
Cir. 1975 ), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 37 ( 1975) (instructions relating to exercise of discretion in 
certification of voluntarily departing aliens). 
121. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 118 (adverse effects of imposing section 553 procedures 
on policy issuauces and statutory constructions). 
122. I d. at 118-19, 
123. See, e.g., Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 573 (1970); Peck, A Critique of the 
National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and 
Rulemaking, 117 U. PA. L. REV.254, 260 (1968); Peck, TheAtrophiedRule-Making Powers 
oftheNationalLaborRelationsBoard, 70YALEL.J. 729(1961). 
124. One reason for the NLRB's reluctance to pursue section 553 rulemaking is the 
Board's unique political situation. The Board understandably seeks to avoid the titanic 
clash between big labor and big business in a public rulemaking. Case-by-case adjudication 
avoids turning the decisionmaking process into a political pressure cooker. 
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adopted in the process of the adjudication of Excelsior Underwear, 
Inc., 125 could have been a legislative rule. The Board could have 
discontinued the adjudicative proceeding and shifted to section 553 
rulemaking or severed the general policymaking consideration from the 
specific adjudication. 
The Supreme Court reviewed the rule adopted in Excelsior and the 
process employed in formulating the rule in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon 
Co.126 The plurality opinion severely criticized the Board for its 
reluctance to make rules through public procedures.127 The majority 
holding, however, reversed the First Circuit's decision that the Board 
acted improperly in promulgating the Excelsior rule without notice and 
comment.128 1'he Court based its decision on theNLRB'sreliance upon 
an adjudicative determination, independent of the Excelsior rule, that 
Wyman-Gordon should produce a list of employees.129 The majority 
reasoned that the NLRB had the authority to make such an 
adjudicative determination in an individual case and that the existence 
of a rule relating to the same subject, whether legally promulgated or 
not, would not support reversal of the NLRB's action.130 
An alternative ground for the decision in Wyman-Gordon could have 
been that the Excelsior rule was not intended to be a legislative rule. 
The Court might have found that the Board only intended to develop 
and disclose general policy by which to guide future action, and to this 
extent, it acted in conformity with the AP A and the primary values of 
required rulemaking and public disclosure of agency policy. The 
systematic formulation and articulation of general policy in some form 
of rule is preferable to no policy development or disclosure at all. 
Because of the pervasive effect of the Excelsior policy statement, 
however, and the absence of a stated reason for not undertaking some 
form of general notice ana comment procedure, the Court in 
Wyman-Gordon perhaps should have required the NLRB to employ 
procedures for public input even though the AP A did not require such 
stepsol31 . 
125. 156 N.L.R.B.1236 (1966). 
126. 394 u.s. 759 (1969). 
127. Id. at 764·66. 
128. I d. at 766. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. The Board did solicit comments from those who might have been affected by the 
rule but were not parties to the adjudication, but it did not give general notice and 
opportunity to participate. I d. at 763. 
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An example of the adverse effects of the failure to formulate and 
disclose policy is the NLRB's refusal to openly articulate clear policy in 
its handling of discrimination by labor unions. The Board has refused to 
announce any policy in this area, even through a nonlegislative rule. 
The desirability of some form of rulemaking is clear: the absence of 
defined policy creates a substantial problem for labor unions 
attempting to comply with the law.132 A court inclined to require 
rulemaking for the purpose of disclosing agency policy may be working 
against itself by insisting on legislative rulemaking. A court should 
require the formulation and articulation of policy, but flexibly view the 
type of rule required and the form of agency procedure permitted. In 
many instances, either an interpretative rule or a general statement of 
policy will serve as well as a legislative rule to define terms or to 
consolidate and disclose policy. Efforts to encourage or require 
rulemaking must always recognize that any form of policy formulation 
may serve, in a specific context, to disclose agency policy and that too 
much procedure may have a greater negative impact on that goal than 
the additional procedures can offset with increased participation and 
greater information. 
Careful consideration of the negative impact of additional pro-
cedures, such as the potential for secret policy formulation, should 
temper the enthusiasm for the imposition of procedural requirements. 
To state that a court considering imposition of additional procedures 
for exempt substantive rules should weigh these negative factors, 
however, is not to say that a court must avoid altogether the imposition 
of additional procedures. These countervailing considerations are 
important and a court cannot lightly disregard them in considering 
additional procedures. Courts can weigh the negative factors against the 
benefits that might accrue from additional procedures and strike a 
balance, which, if in favor of no procedures, will dictate against 
imposition. If the balance tips in favor of abbreviated. procedures, a 
court should be free to order whatever public procedures appear 
necessary. The analysis that sees only two alternatives, no procedures or 
else section 553 procedures, should be replaced with a more flexible 
analysis, which, while weighing the negative factors, encourages courts 
to consider the positive aspects of a limited form of public participa-
tion. Thus, the secret policy objection to the imposition of additional 
procedural requirements loses force where the possible detriments of 
132. See Comment, Application of Mansion House: Denial of Certification an N.L.R.B. 
Dilemma, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 762, 779-83 (1975) (use of rulemaking suggested as 
alternative to ad hoc adjudication to promote certainty and uniform standards in NLRB 
certification). 
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imposed procedures are carefully considered and the additional 
procedures may be a modest accommodation to public participation 
and informed decisionmaking. 
STATUTORY PROIDBITION 
The fear that the burden of extra procedures would cause agencies to 
keep policies secret contributed to the legislative decision to exempt 
interpretative rules and general statements of policy from section 
553.133 Because Congress specifically exempted such rules, critics of 
additional procedures can argue that the courts may not properly 
impose procedures where Congress did not. Nothing in the legislative 
history indicates that Congress intended to preclude the judicial 
imposition of public procedures. The House Judiciary Committee 
reported that: 
Agencies are given discretion to dispense with notice (and 
consequently with public proceedings) in the case of interpre-
tative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure or practice; but this does not mean 
that they should not undertake public procedures in con-
nection with such rulemaking where useful to them or helpful 
to the public.134 
The drafters of the Act did not preclude the courts from a role in this 
determination. Certainly the courts can examine agency action for 
abuse of discretion, and the AP A provides for this review .135 Thus, 
where Congress granted the agency the discretion to forego procedures, 
it must have meant for the courts to review the exercise of that 
discretion. 
Recent decisions refer to section 553 as setting minimum procedures 
for -the promulgation of legislative rules.136 The approach suggested 
above, that courts sometimes require public procedures for interpre-
tative rules and general statements of policy, is built on the same 
flexible view of the AP A as a minimum upon which additional 
133. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 18. Several reasons were cited for the 
exemptions: a desire to encourage the promulgation of such rules; recognition that 
discretion is necessary given the diverse contents and times of issuance of such rules; 
acknowledgment of a procedure by which such rules could be reconsidered; and, the 
availability of plenary judicial review of such rules. I d. 
134. I d. at 258. The Senate Committee Report contains virtually the same language. I d. 
at200. 
135. Administrative Procedure Act§ 10( e) (B) (1), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (A) (1970). 
136. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251·52 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630·31 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
Chicago v. FPC, 458 F .2d 731, 743-44 (D.C. Cir.1971),cert. denied, 405 U.S.1074 (1972). 
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procedures should be added where appropriate. This reflects the "new 
era" announced by the District of Columbia Circuit in Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 137 in which courts should act to 
"ensure that the administrative process itself will confine and control 
the exercise of discretion."138 Part of this process involves assisting the 
agencies in developing a "framework for principled decision-
making."139 An expansion of the procedural horizons for interpretative 
rules and general statements of policy clearly conforms to this modern 
view of the .AP A. Courts in the new era should recognize that agencies 
must have broad discretion in the choice of procedures and that the 
judiciary should not unduly interfere with the exercise of that 
discretion. Nevertheless, the new flexibility in interpreting the .AP A 
provisions leaves courts free to assume a role in the choice of 
procedures. Thus, consistent with the purposes of the .AP A, courts can 
compel agencies to consider whether additional procedures are neces-
sary to ensure a fair and well-informed decision and can review the 
agencies' procedural choices so as to provide judicial guidance in the 
exercise of discretion. 
UNCERTAINTY 
The third objection to judicial imposition of additional procedures is 
that agencies would be uncertain, until after judicial review, as to what 
procedures to employ in promulgating interpretative rules or general 
statements of policy. Reviewing courts making ad hoc procedural 
determinations cannot ignore this problem. Judge Wright emphatically 
made this point in a recent article dealing with imposition of 
procedures in addition to the section 553 requirements for the 
promulgation of legislative rules.140 He objects to the possibility that 
"after an agency has fully completed its .consideration and 
promulgation of a rule, the reviewing court may demand 
reconsideration under procedures which, in retrospect, strike the court 
as being appropriate to the issues raised."141 Thus, concludes Judge 
Wright, ad hoc and post facto judicial imposition of public procedures 
will waste agency time and effort.142 
Although the problem of agency uncertainty affects all post facto 
impositions of procedures, regardless of the type of rule, it is less 
137. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.1971). 
138. ld. at 598. 
139. ld. 
140. Wright, The Court and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits ofJudicialRelJ!ew, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 384 ( 1974). 
141. ld. 
142. I d. at 376. 
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serious where a court requires some public procedures for the 
promulgation of interpretative rules and general statements of policy 
than where a court adds the elements of a trial to notice and comment 
procedures for legislative rulemaking. Interpretative rules and general 
statements of policy express the view of the agency on a part of the law 
that it is charged with administering. Interpretative rules and general 
statements of policy, unlike legislative rules, still have nearly the same 
effect after a court directs an agency to follow additional procedures as 
they had before: the opinion of the agency still stands for the guidance 
of those affected, even if a court instructs the agency to provide for 
public participation. Consequently, the lack of predictability objection 
should affect the way courts guide agencies in their procedural 
decisions regarding interpretative rules or general statements of policy, 
but the objection does not militate against courts requiring some 
additional procedures. A conscientious agency, encouraged by judicial 
guidance, will be inclined to implement the necessary notice and 
comment procedures without ad hoc judicial imposition. 
CONCLUSION 
New understanding of the procedural possibilities for interpretative 
rules and general statements of policy must accompany sound choice of 
the use of these rules. Although not now required, the public should 
have some opportunity for participating in the formulation and 
promulgation of interpretative rules and general statements of policy. 
This goal, however, cannot be allowed to engulf the advantages of 
employing nonlegislative rules. The agencies should consider some form 
of public procedure when the need for public participation or for 
improvement in the information-gathering process outweighs the 
detriment that might result from additional procedures. The balancing 
process must also be utilized when considering the number and kind of 
procedures to be appended to the process. 
Two possible methods of analysis exist for accomplishing this 
balancing. Congress could repeal the categorical exemptions in section 
553, and the good cause exemptions could be developed to cover the 
realistic needs for abbreviated procedures for these two rules. A better 
approach, especially considering the unlikelihood of repeal of the 
categorical exemptions, would be the evolution of procedures specially 
tailored to the individual forms of exempt rulemaking through notions 
of fairness and judicial review for abuse of discretion in the agency's 
choice of information-gathering technique. 
None of the three major arguments against additional procedures 
carries enough force to foreclose consideration, in specific instances, of 
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the appropriateness of some public participation. The moderate, 
pragmatic approach recommended here will negate these arguments. A 
procedure likely to improve agency decisionmaking is worth the added 
judicial scrutiny necessary to prevent secret policy, is not contrary to 
the intent of the .AP A, and can be implemented without unnecessary 
uncertainty by a conscientious agency, assisted by judicial guidance. By 
following this approach, the administrative agencies can publicly 
promulgate the large proportion of bureaucratically created law that 
takes the form of interpretative rules and general statements of policy 
without greatly increasing the cost of government. 
